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ABSTRACT
Objective To assess the efficacy of modest non-financial
incentivesonimmunisationratesinchildrenaged1-3and
to compare it with the effect of only improving the
reliability of the supply of services.
Design Clustered randomised controlled study.
Setting Rural Rajasthan, India.
Participants 1640 children aged 1-3 at end point.
Interventions 134 villages were randomised to one of
threegroups:aoncemonthlyreliableimmunisationcamp
(intervention A; 379 children from 30 villages); a once
monthly reliable immunisation camp with small
incentives (raw lentils and metal plates for completed
immunisation; intervention B; 382 children from 30
villages), or control (no intervention, 860 children in 74
villages). Surveys were undertaken in randomly selected
households at baseline and about 18 months after the
interventions started (end point).
Main outcome measures Proportion of children aged 1-3
at the end point who were partially or fully immunised.
Results Among children aged 1-3 in the end point survey,
rates of full immunisation were 39% (148/382, 95%
confidence interval 30% to 47%) for intervention B
villages (reliable immunisation with incentives), 18%
(68/379,11%to23%)forinterventionAvillages(reliable
immunisation without incentives), and 6% (50/860, 3%
to 9%) for control villages. The relative risk of complete
immunisation for intervention B versus control was 6.7
(4.5 to 8.8) and for intervention B versus intervention A
was 2.2 (1.5 to 2.8). Children in areas neighbouring
intervention B villages were also more likely to be fully
immunised than those from areas neighbouring
intervention A villages (1.9, 1.1 to 2.8). The average cost
per immunisation was $28 (1102 rupees, about £16 or
€19) in intervention A and $56 (2202 rupees) in
intervention B.
Conclusions Improving reliability of services improves
immunisationrates,buttheeffectremainsmodest.Small
incentives have large positive impacts on the uptake of
immunisation services in resource poor areas and are
more cost effective than purely improving supply.
Trial registration IRSCTN87759937.
INTRODUCTION
Immunisation is a highly cost effective way of improv-
ing survival in children in developing countries.
12
Every year throughout the world, however, an esti-
mated 27 million children and 40 million pregnant
women do not receive the basic package of immunisa-
tions(asdefinedbyWHOandUnicef),andtwotothree
million people die from diseases that can be prevented
with vaccines.
13 Immunisation rates are in part based
on official statistics and might be over-reported.
45 In
India, immunisation services are offered free in public
healthfacilities,but,despite rapid increases,the immu-
nisation rate remains low in some areas. According to
the National Family Health survey (NFHS-3), in India
only 44% of children aged 1-2 years have received the
basic package.
6 That drops to 22% in rural Rajasthan,
thesettingofthepresentstudy,andwaslessthan 2%in
our study area (a disadvantaged population in rural
Udaipur) at baseline (according to a more detailed sur-
veyinstrumentthanthe NFHS-3,that wasless likely to
overestimate full immunisation rates). Understanding
how to improve the uptake of immunisation is impor-
tant,notonlyforexistingvaccinesbutalsotomaximise
the uptake of any new vaccine.
Reliable supply of free immunisation services and
incentives to improve the demand for these services
could improve immunisation rates. Previous studies
have assessed the effectiveness of financial and non-
financial incentives to encourage immunisation and
other preventive health behaviours. Non-randomised
studies of the measles campaign in Africa suggest that
coupling the distribution of vaccines and bed nets
increases ownership of bed nets by more than 40 per-
centage points,
78 but the studies did not estimate the
programme’s impact on measles vaccination rates. In
Nicaragua, attendance at an immunisation campaign
increased from 77% to 94% when food incentives
equivalent to about three to five days of wages were
introduced to encourage vaccination in 1985.
9 That
study, however, was an observational study in which
the treatments were sequential rather than contem-
poraneous. Conditional cash transfer programmes,
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tive in promoting the use of certain preventive health-
care services and have also had a positive impact on
health outcomes for women and children.
10-13 These
programmes, however, did not have a large impact
on immunisation rates.
14 The lack of impact might be
because of high initial immunisation rates in the areas
where the programmes were carried out. Most condi-
tionalcashtransferprogrammeshavebeenimplemen-
ted in countries with existing adequate local health
infrastructure so evaluations of their impact cannot
shedlightontherelativecosteffectivenessofestablish-
ing incentive based interventions (versus improving
quality of health infrastructure only) in more resource
poor settings.
10
Weassessedtherelativeefficacyandcosteffectiveness
of improving the supply of infrastructure for immunisa-
tion only compared with improving supply and simulta-
neouslyincreasingdemandthroughtheuseofincentives.
The study was a partnership between the Abdul Latif
Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-Pal) at the Massachusetts
Institute ofTechnologyandSeva Mandir,a non-govern-
mental organisation in Udaipur district.
METHODS
We used a clustered randomised controlled trial to
evaluate two interventions in rural Rajasthan, India.
Inoneintervention(A),regular,wellpublicisedimmu-
nisation clinics (referred to as “camps”) were held,
while in the second intervention (B), similar camps
were held and parents were also offered small incen-
tives to immunise their children. A third set of villages
formed the control group. We used a cluster level
design because individual level randomisation could
have generated resentment against the non-govern-
mental organisation.
Selection and description of sample
The main sample comprised 134 villages randomly
selected from a Seva Mandir catchment area in Udai-
pur by using a computer generated random variable
and over-sampling villages far away from a road. We
alsorandomlyselectedonevillagewithin6kmofeach
intervention village to measure potential spillover of
the interventions.
Within each village, a household census was con-
ducted, and 30 households containing children aged
0-5years were randomlyselected witha randomnum-
bergeneratortobepartofthesample.Thesamehouse-
holds were surveyed again at the end point. The
criterion for inclusion of a child in this study was to
belong to a sampled household and to be aged 1-3 at
the end point of the study (main sample) or to have
been aged 0-6 months at baseline (baseline cohort).
As Seva Mandir works in poorer and more tribal
villages, the villages selected are not representative of
UdaipuringeneralbutarerepresentativeofSevaMan-
dir’s catchment area, an impoverished area where
health status is poor.
15 The public facilities serving
these areas are characterised by high absenteeism:
weekly visits during the year preceding the
intervention showed that 45% of the health staff in
charge of immunisations (auxiliary nurse midwives)
were absent from their village level health centre (and
could not be found anywhere in the village) on any
given workday, and there was no predictable pattern
to their absence.
11
Interventions
In this study children received the WHO/Unicef
extended package of immunisation, provided by the
Indian government. This includes one dose of BCG
vaccine,threedosesofDPT(diphtheria-pertussis,teta-
nus)vaccine,threedosesoforalpoliovaccine,andone
dose of measles vaccine.
16 A child should be fully
immunised (that is, have received all the vaccines in
the extended package) by the age of 1 year.
Given that a full immunisation course requires at
leastfivevisitstoapublichealthfacility,theunreliabil-
ityoftheauxiliarynursemidwivesmightdeterfamilies
fromtakingtheirchildrentothecentretocompletethe
full immunisation schedule.Therefore, intervention A
(“immunisation camps”) focused on establishing regu-
laravailabilityofimmunisationservices.Itconsistedof
a mobile immunisation team, including a nurse and
assistant (both hired by Seva Mandir), who conducted
monthly immunisation camps in the villages. The
nurse and assistant held the camp on a fixed date
every month at a fixed time (11 am to 2 pm). The pre-
sence of the nurse and assistant was verified by the
requirement of timed and dated pictures of them in
the villages and by regular monitoring. Review of
records showed that of 1336 planned camps, 95%
(1269) took place. In addition, in each village a social
worker was responsible for identifying children,
informing mothers about the availability of the immu-
nisation camps, and educating them about the benefits
of immunisation. Seva Mandir has been active in the
area for over 50 years and is trusted in villages. While
this programme was new, and Seva Mandir had not
been engaged in any effort to provide immunisation
before, the health unit of the organisation had been
conducting several programmes in these villages or in
neighbouring villages, most notably an effective pro-
gramme of training traditional birth attendants for
delivery. Many villages also already had health social
workers, responsible for general health advice, infor-
mation on prenatal and other preventive care, referral
to health centres, and help with the DOT (directly
observed therapy) programme. The organisation thus
benefits from a high level of trust among villagers,
which might have ameliorated issues of mistrust that
surround immunisation programmes in India.
17
Intervention B used the same infrastructure as inter-
vention A but in addition offered parents 1 kg of raw
lentilsperimmunisationadministeredandasetofthalis
(metalplatesusedformeals)oncompletionofa child’s
fullimmunisation.Thevalueofthelentilswasabout40
rupees (about $1), equivalent to three quarters of one
day’s wage, and the value of the thalis was about 75
rupees. Seva Mandir decided to provide lentils, rather
than cash, as this was useful to the family and also
RESEARCH
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corresponds to the opportunity cost of time for the
mother. The thalis were chosen as a tangible sign of
achievement, while also being of immediate use.
At the first immunisation, every child was given an
official immunisation card indicating their name, the
name of their parent/s, and the date and type of each
immunisation performed. The nurse also kept a
detailed logbook. Following standard guidelines,
when a child arrived at a camp without an immunisa-
tion cardand it could notbe ascertainedwhetherheor
she had received a given immunisation, the child was
immunised.
18
Study and evaluation design
We evaluated the impact of the interventions using a
clustered randomised control trial. Using the random
number generator in the statistical package Stata (ver-
sion 9), and after stratification by geographical block
(the administrative unit above the village), one author
(ED) randomly selected 30 of the 134 study villages to
receive intervention A and 30 to receive intervention
B. The 74 remaining villages were control villages and
received no additional intervention. Naturally, given
the context and the intervention, the allocation of vil-
lages to treatment or control was not blind. In most
controlvillages,a Seva Mandir healthworkerwaspre-
sent and encouraging uptake of preventive services,
includingimmunisation,waspartoftheirmission.Vil-
lagers were to obtain immunisation in the closest
health centre. In all villages, the government nurse
continued to provide immunisation services for the
duration of the study. When a camp was established
in a village, any non-immunised child younger than
5, from any village, was eligible for immunisation in
the camp. All children younger than 2 were eligible
for the lentils in intervention B camps, irrespective of
the village they came from. (Villages from all three
treatment groups were sufficiently far from each
other (over 20 km) so we expected no contamination
between the villages.) Children who began the immu-
nisation course before turning 2 remained eligible for
the incentives until the completion of the immunisa-
tion course. Therefore children included in the study
sample were aged 1-3 at the end point survey.
Data sources
Our primary outcome was the receipt of all or part of
the extended package of immunisation. Most house-
holds in the areas did not have immunisation cards so
we ascertained the immunisation rate during inter-
views with the mother. Mothers were surveyed about
the immunisation status of all children aged under 7 at
the end point and about her immunisation status dur-
ing her pregnancy with each child.
We developed our survey instrument to elicit accu-
rate reporting of immunisation status, regardless of
where the immunisation was obtained (camp, health
centres, private doctor). Because a parent might con-
fuse immunisation with other injections (injection of
antibiotics is common in India) and might not realise
the difference between different vaccinations, the
instrument asked in detail about each injection
received by the child, including whether it was admi-
nisteredtocureasickness,inwhichfacilityitwasadmi-
nistered, and where on the body it was injected. In
addition, at the end of the survey, the field officer
examined the child to ascertain whether they had the
distinctive scar left by the BCG vaccine. If the family
had a vaccination card for the child researchers also
recorded the information on the card.
Self reportcanbeinfluencedby recall bias(mothers,
who are often illiterate, might not remember) and
potentially by social desirability bias, which might be
affected by their intervention group. We carried out
several validation exercises in which we compared
the self reports with the BCG scar, the immunisation
card (available for 343 children), and a sample of chil-
dren from intervention villages. The immunisation
camp records were matched with the survey data.
BCG self report seemed to be accurate (see appendix
1 on bmj.com). Immunisation status elicited from the
survey instrument corresponded to within one injec-
tion of the status indicated on the card 79% of the
time and to within one injection of the status indicated
in the logbook 74% of the time. The mis-measurement
wasnotcorrelatedwiththetreatmentstatusorthenum-
ber of immunisations reported and was not systemati-
cally over-reported or under-reported and should
therefore increase noise but not necessarily introduce
bias (as measurement error is the dependent variable
and is not differential in different treatment groups).
While self reports of immunisation from mothers
who do not have an immunisation card is not perfect,
a meta-analysisofseveralvalidationstudieshasshown
that they are generally of acceptable quality and that
they represent “the best available independent mea-
sure of DPT3 coverage.”
4
Nevertheless,toverifythattheresultswerenotbiased
bytheuseofselfreporteddata,wecarriedouttwoaddi-
tional analyses: ananalysisofthe presence ofBCG scar
(observed by the field officer at the end of the mother’s
interview) and an analysis based on the administrative
data maintained in intervention A and intervention B
villages. For these children, a complete computerised
record of immunisation received in the camp and else-
where is maintained.Thisallowsa comparison ofinter-
ventionAandBvillagesforchildrenwhohavereceived
atleastoneimmunisationinthecamp.Forthisanalysis,
we also focused on children aged 1-3.
The baseline survey took place between June 2004
and February 2005 and covered all children aged 0-5
in the sample households. The intervention started in
each geographical block after the baseline investiga-
tions. The end point survey took place between July
2006 and February 2007, about 18 months after the
interventions started in a particular village. It used the
samesurveyinstrumentsandcoveredallchildrenage0-
7inthesamehouseholdstoidentifyeligiblechildren(1-
3atendpoint,or0-6monthsatendpoint).Bothsurveys
were blind: interviewers did not know which villages
belonged to which intervention (or control) group.
RESEARCH
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September 2007 and analysis and report write up took
placebetweenOctober2007andMay2008.Thepaper
was revised a first time between September 2009 and
November 2009 and a second time in March 2010.
End points
Inthehouseholdsample,ourmainanalysisfocusedon
children aged 1- 3 at the end point (that is, eligible and
old enough to be fully immunised). The outcomes
include the probability of receiving at least one immu-
nisation(excludingoralpoliovaccine,whichalmostall
childrenhavereceivedandthereforedoesnotaffectthe
statistics);thepresence oftheBCGscar; the numberof
immunisations received; and the probability of receiv-
ing the complete extended package of immunisation.
Wealsoanalysedtheadministrativedatacollectedin
the camp: the outcomes were the number of immuni-
sations received by children who received at least one
immunisation in the camp, and the probability of
receiving all the vaccines in the extended package of
immunisation.
Complementary analysis reports the impact of the
interventions on neighbouring villages. We report the
probability of being immunised in villages neighbour-
ing intervention A and intervention B camps, differ-
ences between these two groups of neighbouring
villages and the control group, and relative risks.
Costs
We carried out a cost effectiveness analysis of both
interventions (see appendix 2 on bmj.com for details).
Statistical analysis
Takingintoaccountcorrelationofthe endpointwithin
a village and clustering of the treatment at that level (a
intraclustercorrelationof0.25wasassumedbasedona
preliminarysurvey)andgivenabaselineimmunisation
rate of 2% in the control group, we determined that a
sampleof30villagespertreatmentarm,witharandom
sample of 30 households per village (assuming about
1.4 children aged 1-3 years surveyed in each house-
hold), was sufficient to obtain 80% power for a 5%
leveltestofadifferenceofatleastfivepercentagepoints
in the probability of being fully immunised between
anytwogroups(treatmentA,treatmentB,andcompar-
ison). The larger control group increases power.
Weusedintentiontotreatanalysis—thatis,allhouse-
holds were analysed with the assumption that they
remained in the treatment group to which they were
initially assigned. For the binary variables, we report
proportion in each group, difference in proportions
across groups, and relative risks. For the count vari-
ables (number of immunisation), we report values in
thetreatmentgroup,differenceacrossgroups,andrela-
tive risks. The analysis adjusts for clustering at the vil-
lage and the family level. For the difference in
proportion, we used a multilevel mixed effect linear
model of the probability of being immunised on the
treatment indicator, with a hierarchical error structure
that allows cluster level heterogeneity (random effect)
at the village and at the family level. For the relative
risk, we used a multilevel mixed effect Poisson model
with the same hierarchical error structure. We did not
include any control variables. In all the analyses we
used Stata version 10.
Assessed for eligibility (n=134 villages, each with 30 households with children aged 0-7 years at end point)
Randomised
Allocated to intervention A (n=453
  households in 30 villages)
All received allocated intervention
Lost from baseline to end point (n=71
  households)
Allocated to intervention B (n=481
  households in 30 villages)
All received allocated intervention
Lost from baseline to end point (n=82
  households)
Allocated to control (n=1224 households
  in 74 villages)
All received control
Lost from baseline to end point (n=210
  households)
Enrolment
Allocation
Followed up to end point (n=379 children
  aged 1-3 in 30 villages)
Estimated loss to follow-up (n=22 children;
  household moved, unable to find child,
  child died)
Discontinued intervention (n=0)
Followed up to end point (n=382 children
  aged 1-3 in 29 villages)
Estimated loss to follow-up (n=13 children;
  household moved, unable to find child,
  child died)
Discontinued intervention (n=0)
Followed up to end point (n=866 children
  aged 1-3 in 69 villages)
Lost to lack of covariates (n=6 children)
Estimated loss to follow-up (n=44 children;
  household moved, unable to find child,
  child died)
Discontinued intervention (n=0)
Follow-up
Analysed (n=379 children, none excluded) Analysed (n=382 children, none excluded) Analysed (n=860 children, none excluded)
Analysis
Excluded (n=4246):
  Did not meet inclusion criteria (too old or too young at end point) (n=4246)
  Refused to participate (n= 0)
  Other reasons (n=0)
(randomisation occurred at village level; all villages assigned to receive treatment did so)
Fig 1 | Flow of participants through study
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The final sample in the household surveys included
2188 children aged 1-3 years at the end point from
2898 households in five groups of villages: 74 control
villages (n=860 children), 30 villages in intervention
group A (n=379), 30 in intervention group B (n=382),
27 neighbouring an intervention group A village
(n=265), and 26 neighbouring an intervention group
B village (n=302) (fig 1).
Baseline characteristics of children across the treat-
ment arms were comparable (table 1). There were no
differences in proportions of children partially or fully
immunised at baseline or in the covariates. Immunisa-
tion rates were less than 2% among 1-3 year olds. The
intracluster correlation at baseline was 0.28.
The final sample with logbook data included 2106
children aged 1-3 who received at least one immunisa-
tion in the camps: 407 in 30 villages in intervention A
and 725 in 30 villages in intervention B.
Primary end point: impact on immunisation in treatment
village
Thehighestrateoffullimmunisationwasobservedfor
intervention B (table 2, fig 2). In intervention B vil-
lages, 148/382 (mean 39%, 95% confidence interval
30% to 47%) children were completely immunised
compared with 68/379 (18%, 11% to 23%) in inter-
vention A villages and 50/860 (6%, 3% to 9%) in con-
trol villages (fig 2). The relative risk of being
completely immunised was 3.1 (2.0 to 4.2) for inter-
vention A versus control, 6.7 (4.5 to 8.8) for inter-
vention B versus control, and 2.2 for intervention B
versus intervention A (1.5 to 2.8). Compared with the
control group, immunisation rates more than doubled
in intervention A villages and increased by more than
six times in the intervention B villages. There were no
adverse events (severe reaction to immunisation)
reported in either intervention groups.
The difference between intervention B and inter-
vention A was more marked for full immunisation
thanforthenumberofimmunisationsreceivedanddis-
appeared for the probability of receiving at least one
injection. Specifically, 78% (70% to 85%) of children in
intervention A villages received at least one injection
compared with 74% (67% to 82%) of children in inter-
vention B villages. Similarly, 50% (41% to 59%) of chil-
drenininterventionAvillagesand50%(41%to59%)of
children in intervention B villages had a BCG scar (v
28% (21% to 36%) in control villages) (fig 3), showing
thattheimpactoftheincentivewasmainlytoreducethe
number of children dropping out after three injections.
Over half (52%, 43% to 62%) of children who were
reported as receiving at least one injection in inter-
vention B villages were completely immunised com-
pared with 23% (15% to 32%) in intervention A.
The analysis of the logbooks confirms these results.
Of the children who received at least one injection in
the camps, 485/700 (67%, 59% to 74%) were fully
immunised in intervention B and 197/407 (48%, 38%
to 59%) were fully immunised in intervention A. The
relative risk of being completely immunised in inter-
vention B compared with intervention A for children
who received at least one injection was 1.4 (1.1 to 1.7).
The propensity for children to drop out before com-
pleting the full course, particularly in intervention A
villages,was not because the camps became less popu-
lar over time: children who received their first immu-
nisation later received on average the same number of
immunisations as children who received their first
immunisation earlier.
Impact on neighbouring villages
Table 3 shows immunisation rates in villages neigh-
bouring the intervention villages. In villages within a
fewkilometresofaninterventionBcamp,61/302chil-
dren (20%, 10% to 31%) were completely immunised
compared with 36/265 children (11%, 5% to 16%) in
villagesborderinganinterventionAcamp.Thesecon-
fidenceintervalsoverlap,but therelativeriskissignifi-
cantly greater than one. The relative risk of being
completelyimmunisedforvillagesneighbouringinter-
Table 1 |Baseline characteristics by allocated group*. Figures are percentages of children
unless stated otherwise
Control group Treatment A Treatment B
Mean age (months) 10.2 (9.2 to 11.3) 10.4 (8.8 to 12.0) 11.06 (9.72 to
12.40)
Mean household size (No of people) 6.7 (6.5 to 7.0) 6.7 (6.3 to 7.1) 6.74 (6.46 to 7.03)
Male 0.5 (0.5 to 0.6) 0.5 (0.4 to 0.6) 0.50 (0.44 to 0.57)
Member of scheduled castes/scheduled
tribes (disadvantaged group)
0.9 (0.8 to 1.0) 0.9 (0.8 to 1.0) 0.96 (0.8 to 1.02)
Literate head of household 0.4 (0.3 to 0.4) 0.4 (0.3 to 0.5) 0.37 (0.27 to 0.47)
Monthly household income† 2858.70 (2433.17
to 3284.23)
3196.57 (2743.95
to 3649.18)
2729.09 (2374.79
to 3083.39)
Land size owned by family (in bighas‡) 3.9 (3.5 to 4.3) 4.0 (3.5 to 4.5) 3.51 (2.98 to 4.04)
Below poverty line 0.5 (0.5 to 0.6) 0.5 (0.4 to 0.6) 0.50 (0.42 to 0.59)
No of rooms in house 2.0 (1.8 to 2.2) 2.1 (1.8 to 2.4) 1.90 (1.74 to 2.06)
House has electricity 0.2 (0.1 to 0.2) 0.2 (0.1 to 0.3) 0.06 (0 to 0.12)
Treats water 1.1 (1.1 to 1.2) 1.1 (1.0 to 1.1) 1.08 (1.03 to 1.12)
No of immunisations 0.6 (0.5 to 0.8) 0.8 (0.5 to 1.1) 0.45 (0.25 to 0.65)
Completely immunised 0.01 (0 to 0.01) 0.02 (0 to 0.04) 0.00 (0 to 0.02)
At least one injection 0.3 (0.3 to 0.4) 0.4 (0.3 to 0.5) 0.30 (0.19 to 0.4)
*A=reliable immunisation camps, 30 villages; B=reliable immunisation camps with incentives, 30 villages;
control=no treatment, 74 villages.
†In rupees (1000 rupees = about £15, €17, $23).
‡Generally <1 acre (0.4 hectare).
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Fig 2 | Percentage of children aged 1-3 years fully immunised
by treatment status
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vention A camps was 1.9 (1.1 to 2.8) (table 3).
This analysis is confirmed in the logbook data,
where results are more precise. In villages within a
few kilometres of an intervention B camp, 452/700
children who received at least one immunisation
(65%, 58% to 72%) were completely immunised com-
pared with 69/208 children (33%, 23% to 44%) in vil-
lages bordering an intervention A camp.
Costs
The average cost to Seva Mandir of fully immunising a
child was $27.94 (1102 rupees, about £16 or €19) in the
reliable camp with incentives and $55.83 (2202 rupees)
in the reliable camp without incentives (see appendix 2
on bmj.com for further details). The difference comes
from the fact that camps had to be open from 11 am to
2 pm, regardless of the number of children present.
Thus, the higher average number of children in the
camps with incentives spread the daily fixed cost
(mainly, the salary of the nurse and assistant) over
more children. The marginal cost of an extra child
being fully immunised with and without incentive in a
given camp is, respectively, $6.60 and $1.30. The sal-
aries of the nurse and assistant represent about half of
the cost of the camp without incentives. Monitoring
that the camps are regularly held is another important
part of the cost, which is necessary in light of high
absenteeism.
14 When we calculated the cost that would
be incurred by a government able to use an existing
health infrastructure, the average cost of fully immunis-
ing a child was estimated at $25.18 in camps without
incentives and $17.35 in camps with incentives.
DISCUSSION
Summary of results
This randomised controlled study of immunisation
camps shows that offering modest incentives to
families in resource poor settings can significantly
increase uptake of immunisation services, when reli-
able services are available. In our study, reliable
camps with incentives achieved significantly higher
rates of full immunisation for children aged 1-3 com-
pared with control areas where no camps were made
available and compared with reliable camps without
incentives. Whilecontrol villageshad a full immunisa-
tionrateofnearly6%,villagesinwhichareliablecamp
was held showed rates of around 18%, and adding the
incentive pushed rates to nearly 40%, a significant
increase. The rate achieved with incentives represents
a more than sixfold increase over the rate in control
villages,in a particularlypoor and hard to reachpopu-
lation. It is, however, still too low to achieve herd
immunity.
Surprisingly,despitethatfactthatthefamilyreceived
a set of plates for the last immunisation, the biggest
increasebetweeninterventionAandinterventionBvil-
lages was for the third and fourth immunisation. This
mightindicatethatparentsaremoresensitivetothefact
that there is an incentive than to the level of the incen-
tive, a finding consistent with the results that in condi-
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Fig 3 | Number of immunisations received by children aged
1-3 years
Table 2 |Effects of group allocation (A=immunisation, B=immunisation plus incentive). Numbers are in absolute values
Mean (95% CI) Difference* (95% CI) Relative risk† (95% CI)
Control A B A−control B−control B−AA v control B v control B v A
End point cohort (aged 1-3 years)
No in group 860 379 382 ——— —— —
No of immunisations 1.20
(0.94 to 1.46)
2.35
(1.99 to 2.71)
2.85
(2.44 to 3.25)
1.15
(0.95 to 1.35)
1.70
(1.48 to 1.92)
0.55
(0.26 to 0.83)
2.14
(1.84 to 2.44)
2.66
(2.28 to 3.05)
1.22
(1.08 to 1.36)
≥1i m m u n i s a t i o n 0 . 4 9
(0.40 to 0.57)
0.78
(0.70 to 0.85)
0.74
(0.67 to 0.82)
0.29
(0.23 to 0.35)
0.26
(0.20 to 0.33)
−0.03
(−0.09to0.04)
1.59
(1.35 to 1.83)
1.52
(1.29 to 1.75)
0.96
(0.80 to 1.11)
Has BCG scar‡ 0.28
(0.21 to 0.36)
0.50
(0.41 to 0.59)
0.50
(0.41 to 0.59)
0.22
(0.15 to 0.28)
0.22
(0.15 to 0.28)
0.00
(−0.08to0.08)
1.76
(1.41 to 2.12)
1.76
(1.41 to 2.12)
1.00
(0.79 to 1.21)
Completely immunised 0.06
(0.03 to 0.09)
0.18
(0.11 to 0.25)
0.39
(0.30 to 0.47)
0.13
(0.09 to 0.16)
0.34
(0.30 to 0.38)
0.21
(0.15 to 0.28)
3.09
(1.96 to 4.21)
6.66
(4.53 to 8.80)
2.16
(1.54 to 2.78)
Logbook cohort (aged 1-3 years)
No in group — 407 725 ——— —— —
Total No of immunisations — 3.70
(3.39 to 4.01)
4.18
(3.99 to 4.37)
—— 0.59
(0.25 to 0.93)
—— 1.15
(1.05 to 1.25)
Completely immunised — 0.48
(0.38 to 0.59)
0.67
(0.59 to 0.74)
—— 0.22
(0.10 to 0.33)
—— 1.43
(1.12 to 1.73)
*Estimated by fitting multilevel mixed effect linear model, with clustering at hamlet and household level.
†Estimated by fitting multilevel mixed effect Poisson regression, with clustering at hamlet and household level.
‡For analysis with BCG scar as outcome, there were 790 observations in control group, 334 in treatment A group, and 336 in treatment B group.
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does not seem to matter beyond the fact that there is a
positive transfer,
1920 and suggests that larger incentives
mightnotincreasetheimmunisationratemuchbeyond
what was found here. Moreover, while a campwithout
incentivesincreasedimmunisationratesonlyinthevil-
lage where it took place, camps with incentives also
increased rates in neighbouring villages.
Comparison with other studies
Several previous studies have shown that uptake of pre-
ventive behaviours is sensitive to small incentives or
small costs, suggesting that incentives can play a role in
promoting preventive health services.
9192122 Other
researchers have suggested that in resource poor set-
tings, ensuring a reliable supply of health services and
educating parents about the benefits of preventive care
are more important than providing incentives.
923 Our
findings contrast with those of a study in Timor Leste,
which found that food incentives did not increase the
completion of tuberculosis treatment.
24 This difference
mightbeattributabletovariousfactors:thefrequencyof
the treatment (vaccines versus daily treatment); the fact
thatadultsweretargetedinthetuberculosisintervention;
therelativelyhighinitialcompliancerate;andthediffer-
enceindemandfortreatmentandprevention.Morestu-
dies are needed to understand in what conditions
incentives forparents orpatientshave a positive impact.
Limitations of study
We relied in part on self reported data on immunisa-
tion, though the results were robust when we used the
BCGscarortheimmunisationreportedinthelogbook
asoutcomes.Thestudywasnotblindfromthepointof
view of the villagers, who might have been motivated
to attend the camp to ensure that Seva Mandir would
not cancel the programme. The study was also con-
ducted in an environment with low density where
initial immunisation rates were extremely low. In
areaswhereinitialimmunisationratesarehigher,simi-
lar interventions might not produce as dramatic an
increase. On the other hand, the impacts might be
muchhigherandthecostsmuchlowerinmoredensely
populated regions. Finally, we could look only at the
joint effect of improving supply and incentivising
demand. Because it would have been impossible to
administer in practice, we could not introduce an
incentive programme without simultaneously making
the supply more reliable.
Policy implications
Themagnitudeofourresultsshowsthat,inthissetting,
holding regular immunisation camps combined with
incentives improves immunisation rates, even though
therateoffullimmunisationremainedlow.Moreover,
providing incentives and improving the supply of ser-
vices was also more cost effective than improving the
supply of services alone. The cost of immunising with
incentive (around $17.35) is higher than the cost cur-
rently in the Indian budget (about $4 per immunisa-
tion, according to the healthcare budget
25), but it is of
an order of magnitude comparable with the payment
from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisa-
tion (GAVI) to member countries of $20 per “extra
child”whowouldnothavebeenimmunisedotherwise.
This is a relevant comparison as these kinds of pro-
gramme would target “difficult to reach” children
whoarenotalreadyimmunisedunderIndia’sstandard
programme. A review of interventions to improve
immunisationfoundthatthecostofmostinterventions
is about $10-20 per newly immunised child.
26 More-
over, while the lentils represented a cost to Seva Man-
dir, their distribution could have led to improved
nutrition for the family in an environment where mal-
nutrition and anaemia are endemic, and it is not clear
they should be considered as a cost.
Table 3 |Effects of treatment in villages adjacent to intervention or control villages (A=immunisation, B=immunisation plus incentive)
Mean in group (95% CI) Difference* (95% CI) Relative risk† (95% CI)
Control Treat A B A−control B−control B−AA v control B v control B v A
End point cohort (aged 1-3 years)
No in group 860 265 302 ——— —— —
No of immunisations 1.20
(0.94 to 1.46)
1.41
(0.94 to 1.88)
1.70
(1.18 to 2.22)
0.23
(0.00 to 0.46)
0.58
(0.35 to 0.82)
0.36
(0.02 to 0.69)
1.18
(0.92 to 1.43)
1.48
(1.18 to 1.77)
1.26
(0.93 to 1.60)
≥1i m m u n i s a t i o n 0 . 4 9
(0.40 to 0.57)
0.49
(0.34 to 0.64)
0.51
(0.39 to 0.63)
0.01
(−0.06to0.09)
0.05
(−0.02to0.12)
0.03
(−0.06to0.12)
1.00
(0.80 to 1.19)
1.05
(0.86 to 1.24)
1.05
(0.81 to 1.30)
Has BCG scar‡ 0.28
(0.21 to 0.36)
0.28
(0.16 to 0.41)
0.30
(0.18 to 0.41)
0.01
(−0.06to0.08)
0.03
(−0.04to0.10)
0.02
(−0.07to0.10)
1.00
(0.73 to 1.28)
1.05
(0.78 to 1.32)
1.05
(0.70 to 1.39)
Completely immunised 0.06
(0.03 to 0.09)
0.11
(0.05 to 0.16)
0.20
(0.10 to 0.31)
0.05
(0.01 to 0.09)
0.16
(0.12 to 0.20)
0.11
(0.05 to 0.18)
1.83
(0.93 to 2.73)
3.47
(2.18 to 4.77)
1.91
(1.06 to 2.77)
Logbook cohort (aged 1-3 years)
No in group — 208 700 ——— —— —
Total No of immunisations — 3.23
(2.91 to 3.55)
4.15
(3.95 to 4.35)
—— 0.92
(0.50 to 1.35)
—— 1.28
(1.14 to 1.42)
Completely immunised — 0.33
(0.23 to 0.44)
0.65
(0.58 to 0.72)
—— 0.30
(0.15 to 0.45)
—— 1.91
(1.36 to 2.45)
*Estimated by fitting multilevel mixed effect linear model, with clustering at village and household level.
†Estimated by fitting multilevel mixed effect Poisson regression, with clustering at village and household level.
‡For the analysis with BCG scar as outcome, there were 790 observations in control group, 239 in treatment A group, and 252 in treatment B group.
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in the villages with camps with incentives (and in the
surrounding villages) is that they were busier than
those without incentives. Inspection of the logbook
showed that for any given camp, each day an average
of 4.5 immunisations were given without incentives
and 13.4 with incentives.
Interpretation, unanswered questions, and future research
Ourresultsalso suggestreasonsthatimmunisationhas
not been more widely embraced in developing coun-
tries. Previous work has emphasised the need to
strengthen health systems to achieve the millennium
development goals.
27 Our results suggest that to
achieve this strengthening, improving the supply
alonemightnotbeenough:evenafullyreliablesupply
system has a relatively modest effect on uptake of
immunisation. In intervention A, even when access
was good and a social worker constantly reminded
parents of the benefits of immunisation, more than
80%didnotgettheirchildrenfullyimmunised.Never-
theless, more than 75% obtained the first injection
without the incentive and stopped attending the
camps only after two or three injections. This shows
that the parents do not have strong objections or fears
about immunisation, but that they are not persuaded
enough about its benefits to overcome the natural ten-
dency to delay a slightly costly activity (immunisation
is free, but it takes some time and effort to go to the
centre and get the child immunised, and the child
might have a fever afterwards). This fits the findings
ofsociologicalresearchinIndia,wherenursesdescribe
parents forgetting to bring their children to the immu-
nisationday,andwheretheyareparticularlycarefulto
manage even benign side effects of immunisation to
avoid discouraging parents from coming back.
5 It
alsoexplainsthetendencyforchildrennottocomplete
the whole course of immunisation. Providing the len-
tils helps to overcome this procrastination because the
lentils make the occasion a small “plus” rather than a
small “minus.” Thus, in the case of preventive care,
small barriers might turn out to have large implica-
tions. Finding effective ways to overcome small bar-
riers might hold the key to large improvements in
immunisation rates and uptake of other preventive
health behaviours. In the case of immunisation, small
incentives coupled with regular delivery of services
seem to have the potential to play this role.
While we primarily examined the effect of small
incentivesandsupplyimprovementwhentheyarecor-
rectly implemented, we need to know whether and
how such an incentive programme could be general-
ised. Under the National Rural Health Mission, the
government of India now has a health worker in each
village who is responsible for encouraging uptake of
preventive care. Furthermore, several Indian states,
including those with comparatively low immunisation
rates (Orissa, Bihar, Rajasthan), are already imple-
menting a “camp” approach, where the regular auxili-
ary nurse midwife immunises children in villages on a
rotatingschedule.Wearehopingtoconductanimpact
evaluationoftheadditionofsmallincentivestoparents
inthisstructure,incollaborationwiththestategovern-
mentinIndia,toevaluatethepotentialofthesetypesof
intervention to be adopted as large scale policies and
the challenges that would need to be overcome.
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